<%@LANGUAGE="JAVASCRIPT" CODEPAGE="1252"%> Civic Solidarity and Hauerwas

 

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Civic Solidarity and Catholic Social Thought:

A Critique of Hauerwas

by

R. Chase Skorburg

 

[Mr Skorburg, a native of Dallas, Texas, graduated from Princeton University and is in the MAR program of Yale Divinity School. This essay was written for a Seminar on Political Theology at YDS for the spring semester of 2006 taught by Joe R. Jones, then Visiting Professor of Theology. Used here by permission. Copyright©R. Chase Skorburg. Posted here 2/24/07.]



Part One

Various Christian theologians have questioned the merit of political liberalism since its inception. Things today are no different. The shape of modern theologians’ suspicions, however, has its own particularities. A growing movement claims liberalism’s political values and ways of thinking about morality are seeping into society as a whole. And the stone walls and stained glass windows of churches provide no protection from this seepage. Monadic individualism, an ethical emphasis on rights, and anemic conceptions of justice and freedom, according to this view, compromise the current health of the church and, correspondingly, the health of Christians’ souls. Figures like Stanley Hauerwas, John Howard Yoder, and John Milbank, among others, represent this view. They critique liberalism to varying degrees on varying grounds, but all agree that liberalism’s values threaten the health of the church. Furthermore, of late they have gained prominence and are cited regularly as noteworthy American theologians.

This is probably because, to many, they seem flatly right about liberalism’s inadequacies. Humans are, in an important sense, political, social animals; thus, as much as liberalism may intend to allow citizens to pursue thick conceptions of the good outside of the ‘thin consensus’ of the political sphere, the political sphere is bound to influence citizens’ moral thinking.

Reacting to this, Hauerwas and others call Christians to take back the church. More specifically, they exhort Christians to reclaim an ethos of subversion whereby the particularity of Christian values and virtues may flourish in community as an alternative politics to the politics of liberalism. Constitutive of this exhortation is a repudiation of the view that a person’s public life need not affect him or her epistemically. These theologians claim, to the contrary, that moral knowledge is a communal affair. Humans learn values and virtues from the communities with which they interact socially. Accordingly, notions like justice and even rationality are not free-standing. They are conditioned. They are learnt according to the community one inhabits and the unique moral tenets it employs. Consequently, “practical moral reasoning, if Christian, must always be expected to be at some point subversive.”[1] And this is because “the church precedes the world epistemologically.”[2] Thus the church as an alternative politics subverts the very structures of moral rationality the world takes for granted.

In this way, these theologians emphasize a) epistemic incommensurability between different communities of virtue and b) the church’s need to reclaim its role as a particular community with unique values, virtues, and moral practices. Given a) and b), how, then, do these theologians construe Christians’ ability to support, participate in, and ultimately effect extramural (extra-ecclesiastical) political change? This is less clear, and its ambiguity has led individuals to call these figures, to varying degrees, “sectarians.”

Outright sectarians, however, they are not. They all have their own account of how Christians can retain the authenticity of the church’s politics and effect positive social, political change on an extramural level. This paper evaluates the theological merit of Hauerwas’s account. It focuses, in particular, on the topic of solidarity. In virtually all contexts, Hauerwas winces at the idea of civic solidarity. That of which he is perhaps most critical is Christians’ identification of the church with America. Thus, in his eyes, it is precisely a wayward solidarity that most threatens the modern church.

This paper, however, argues that political solidarity, indeed solidarity of a qualified shared epistemic kind with non-Christians, is both to be political desired and theologically warranted (and not necessarily in that order). I make my case for this, first, by unpacking what it is I mean by solidarity—and, perhaps more importantly, what I don’t mean by it. Second, I outline Hauerwas’s ideas about the ills of liberalism, the church as an alternative politics, and the appropriate and inappropriate extramural relations of the church with persons and institutions outside the church. Third, I make my case for the theological warrant of civic solidarity with the help of Catholic social teaching through the lens of Charles E. Curran. Finally, I conclude by employing this theological and definitional work to clarify what kinds of extramural solidarity seem appropriate for Christians and how civic solidarity may serve an irreplaceable purpose in Christian social thinking and practice.

Part 2

What, then, is solidarity? The term is, to be sure, not without its ambiguity. Various groups and thinkers have employed it differently. In an attempt to divorce it from more loaded connotations, consider a basic illustration. Consider the kind of solidarity one tries to foster on a sports team.
If a coach sought to foster a heightened sense of solidarity within members of a basketball team, she would likely give a pep talk. An effective pep talk would include several appeals. It would appeal, first, to the team members’ shared mission, that is, the team’s common goals. The team might have hopes of achieving a state or local championship; conversely, it might simply aim for a performance of which the team can be proud. Whether the goal is more objective, like a championship, or more subjective, like a sense of pride, its character as commonly recognized is central.

A good pep talk, moreover, would seek to foster a shared imagination of the goal. This includes a mutual understanding of the goal and its worth from different imagined ‘angles.’ The coach might, for instance, describe how wonderful it will feel to celebrate being the most excellent team in the state—a mutual understanding of the goal from a certain imagined angle. Or, the coach might describe how winning a state championship will be something the team members will talk about and prize for ever; it will be something no one can take away from them—a mutual imagination of the goal’s worth from a certain angle.

A pep talk at its best would not stop there. It would encourage the team to develop a sense of shared sacrifice, a sense of devotion not just to what the team has to offer each member individually, but to what the members can contribute to something bigger than themselves. To develop a sense of shared sacrifice, a good pep talk would exhort the team to develop an understanding, deep feeling, and appreciation for the kind of reciprocal sacrifice that will obtain in the team’s efforts toward its common goal. This will involve mutual sympathy between the members and a manner of seeing in other members’ eyes, so to speak, reciprocal understanding and requited devotion to each other’s well-being.

A good pep talk would also appeal to the team’s common history. The team has likely shared moments of joy and moments of despair, moments of struggle and moments of rest, moments of solemnity and moments of levity. A good pep talk would undoubtedly appeal to these as a powerful source for what is the final, uniting component of a good pep talk: an appeal to a common identity.
The team members are part of one team, identified, among other things, by their common goal, shared imagination, reciprocal sacrifice, and mutual history. In this way, identity plays a kind of gathering role in a pep talk. It brings the commonalities of the team together into a kind of symbol. Perhaps the coach would conclude, “Because this is what it means to be a tiger!” or “Because that’s what tigers do!” The team’s identity, in this way, gathers the previously identified features of solidarity together, representing, in one synoptic appeal, the commutual pathos forged by a common history (past), sacrifice (present), and purpose (future).

It stands to reason that a good pep talk would include these appeals. And, if successful, it would engender a heightened sense of the following among team members: 1) shared interest, 2) mutual understanding, 3) reciprocal sacrifice, 4) common history, and 5) collective identity. With these in place, the team would take the basketball court with a freshly acquired understanding and feeling of solidarity. The members would understand and feel in a more profound and even accurate way what it means to be the team they are. They would know what it means to be part of something that is both larger than their own private interests and integral to the satisfaction of a deep private interest in cooperating in a constructive social endeavor. In the spirit of solidarity, they would share a common recognition of reciprocal need and mutual sacrifice toward the end of achieving a goal no member could achieve alone.

Given this analysis, how may we encapsulate 1) through 5) in a more general definition? We may say that solidarity is reciprocal recognition of shared intention, understanding, sacrifice, and identity for the sake of a goal requiring cooperation. It may be other things as well, but this definition limns at least several fundamental aspects. Defined as such, what difference does it or should it make concerning our understanding of politics?

In Democracy’s Discontent, Michael Sandel instructively identifies the political importance of solidarity. He does so, first, by describing what a politics without solidarity looks like. And he believes it looks a lot like America today.

America’s prevailing political thinking, he claims, understands the self to be an autonomous, choosing self, unencumbered, as a chooser, by its social contexts. This elemental feature of the human self lends it its dignity. Politics is thereby crafted minimally, structured only to protect free choosing (that which constitutes human dignity). The consequences of this political perspective are as follows:

Conceived as unencumbered selves, we must respect the dignity of all persons, but beyond this, we owe only what we agree to owe. Liberal justice requires that we respect people’s rights (as defined by the neutral framework [of agreement]), not that we advance their good. Whether we must concern ourselves with other people’s good depends on whether, and with whom, and on what terms, we have agreed to do so.[3]

This is what Sandel calls the procedural republic. It claims to impose no rules according to any substantive conception of goodness or badness; doing so might impinge on citizens’ negative freedom from the state. Instead, it claims to impose a mere procedure whereby unencumbered selves may agree amongst themselves on substantive commitments. It is a contractual vision of politics. Its citizens take for granted that politics, for the most part, ought only to arbitrate freely chosen agreements. In fact, it conceives of this very notion to be one upon which rational free agents would contractually agree. The only good, besides freedom of choice, upon which citizens contractually agree is the protection of citizens’ physical well-being. That is, physical protection is largely considered the only warrant for a breach of citizens’ negative freedom from governmental interference. It is also the only legal limit placed on citizens as to how they may craft agreements amongst themselves.

Political reasoning of this kind bears a unique consequence. Political obligation becomes oxymoronic. It makes no sense for a citizen to have any obligation to the wider society, other than his or her obligation not to endanger directly others’ physical well-being. Why? Because it was never agreed to. Jane Citizen’s specific choices, for example, have little to do with the particular systemic injustices which may or may not compel Joe Citizen to live on the sidewalk. Why, then, should she have to pay taxes to enable his education so that he might afford shelter?

This is a politics void of solidarity, and it may be the plight in which we find America’s political consciousness today. If it’s not, all the better. It seems to me partially accurate, accurate from one, nontrivial, descriptive point of view, and Section V speaks to the critique’s potential relevance. For now, though, it is enough for the illustration to show the general importance of solidarity for political life. Without political solidarity, there exist insufficient resources for citizens to collectively imagine and devote themselves to goals that require substantive sacrifice. Without civic solidarity, society lacks adequate energies for collective identification, for example, with citizens who may be victims of systemic injustices of the market economy.

Solidarity, therefore, is to be politically desired. It is the means by which a society can come together toward ends—conceived as common goods—that no individual can accomplish by him or herself. Further, it is the means by which a society transcends perniciously individualistic accounts of politics, wherein politics becomes nothing more than tending to one’s own self-interests without a sense of sacrifice or obligation for the good of others affected by legislation.

While it may be politically desirable, solidarity is not automatically commendable. It can be used for good or bad ends. Thus we may not simply say that any solidarity is good solidarity. To the contrary, it can be extremely dangerous. It is civic solidarity to which we may attribute some of the most extreme instances of human cruelty in recent history. We need only to remember the atrocities of German and Italian fascism to substantiate this point.

Clearly, therefore, civic solidarity can be a source of tyranny and cruelty. What is more, for the Christian it can also be a source of idolatry. Indeed, even seemingly innocuous instances of civic solidarity may constitute idolatrous loyalties. As Gilbert Meilaender writes:

If there is truth in St. Augustine’s assertion that the human heart is restless until it rests in God, the human person can never belong entirely to any historical community, and human virtue can never be defined sufficiently in terms of good citizenship.[4]

To provide for civic solidarity, Sandel endorses a return (as he sees it) to fostering civic virtue. Augustine’s work, however, suggests Christians ought to be at least partially wary of exhortations to civic virtue. The civitas terrena does not rest in God. Its loves and desires lie elsewhere. Only the virtues of the civitas dei are wholly upright. And because history will only recognize God’s city in the eschaton, we can be sure that political virtues in interim history are, at best, imperfect and, at worst, evil.

We find, therefore, that Sandel’s work demonstrates shortcomings of politics without solidarity, but Augustine’s work and events of recent history remind us that civic solidarity is not automatically commendable. Furthermore, developing solidarity by way of civic virtue appears at least potentially dangerous for the Christian citizen and for others. Given this dialectic, how ought Christians, theologically speaking, to understand the merits and demerits of solidarity, especially in the context of America’s prevailing politics?

Part 3

Hauerwas speaks vociferously on just this issue. “My ire,” he writes, is “against Christians who have confused Christianity with liberalism.” [5] His ire, that is to say, is against Christians whose “loyalties” to America and its prevailing views of liberalism compromise more important loyalties to the particularity of the civitas dei, the politics with desires and loves rightly directed toward God.

In After Christendom?, Stanley Hauerwas’s cardinal concern is to reconceive the church. Such a task is imperative because “outside the church…there is no saving knowledge of God.”[6] Accordingly, Hauerwas repudiates the idea that Christians have epistemic access to “saving knowledge of God” outside of the unique practices of the Christian church. The church, Hauerwas believes, is not merely a “voluntary association” wherein pastors extend spiritual wisdom to listeners who then determine its propriety by some independent faculty of reason. Rightly conceived, the church is an integrative social politics. It is a community of discipline to which adherents are bound, constituted by unique practices and conceptions of sociality, justice, salvation, and human flourishing. To be a Christian is to live, breathe, and inhabit this community. It is, theologically speaking, to become grafted to the Body of Christ, the witness of God’s Kingdom on earth.

Bearing this unique mission, the church is “that community constituted by practices by which all other politics are to be judged.”[7] As the Body of Christ, it represents Christ’s Lordship on earth. Representing lordship, it demands all other political, social loyalties unreservedly defer to it. In this way, the church is to be a “counter-cultural politics,” “a politics that is an alternative to the politics [of the world] that otherwise dominates our lives.”[8]

That does not mean Christians ought simply to abandon the world outside the church. Rather, After Christendom? is an attempt to try “to find ways for Christians to recover the church as the locus of habits of speech to sustain [their] lives in service to the world.”[9] This being the case, what habits of speech ought Christians to avoid? And how will avoiding them in effect serve the world?

Hauerwas suggests Christians ought to avoid the ingrained ‘liberal language’ of justice and rights, believing that doing so will provide society with a witness to a truer, more fulfilling, and holier way of relating socially. According to Hauerwas, liberalism treats justice and rights as if they are free-standing moral conceptions. It acts as if they require no further clarification. Citizens of liberal democracies claim rights against each other insouciantly, citing them as things they are justly due. In doing so, however, they (and liberalism generally, Hauerwas believes) fail to acknowledge a fundamental question. If rights are just claims against another, and if justice is giving people their due, who or what determines what persons are due? Philosophic forms of liberalism attempt to answer this question in varying ways. Often these attempts suggest the existence of a theory of justice to which all rational individuals will naturally assent. Hauerwas, however, rejects this idea. “The problem with such reasoning,” he writes, “is the assumption that we share enough to even know what justice might mean.”[10] If citizens fail to share a tradition of values and virtues, there is no theory of justice or correlative list of rights upon which citizens as rational agents can contractually agree. Moreover, the foundational premise of this thinking—the human self as, fundamentally, an unencumbered, monadic rational agent—is likely mistaken in the first place. Hauerwas suggests humans are irreducibly social and therefore are encumbered rationally, encumbered by the social contexts that provide the experiential raw material for moral reasoning to obtain in the first place.

Implementing the fictional premise of ‘unencumbered’ moral reasoning, the free-standing theory of justice attached to this version of liberalism unsurprisingly stresses freedom. Freedom from interference, it avers, is due everyone. Thus the negative freedoms of speech, religion, and the like are the ‘rights’ citizens may claim from the government and each other. Stopping there, however, Hauerwas believes this account of justice leaves unanswered a pivotal question. To what ends should humans fashion their negative freedoms? Liberal conceptions of justice fail to answer this question precisely because, with Hauerwas, they acknowledge that citizens do not “share enough” to posit something substantive toward which to aim—a common good, so to speak. Consequently, citizens often use their freedom from interference to protect nothing but their individual interests. Positive freedom, freedom to certain ends or for certain actions, becomes driven almost entirely by self-interest, and without any semblance of shared values or means of moral reasoning, politics degrades to who has the loudest voice and can market his or her opinions most effectively. More, the “to what end” question becomes largely dominated by the bedfellow of liberalism: capitalism. Because liberalism refuses to ally itself with ideas of to what end citizens should commit their freedom, that is, for what responsibilities liberalism’s negative freedoms are intended, capitalism fills in the gap. Besides protecting one’s own self-interests, the purpose of citizens’ freedom becomes tacitly, if not explicitly, understood as the acquisition of wealth. And distributive justice becomes the only quasi-intelligible form of justice beyond negative freedoms.

Given Hauerwas’s view of the misplaced and misunderstood emphasis on rights and justice today, he believes Christians “will speak more truthfully to our society and be of greater service” by simply refusing to use this language. [11] He believes the only theologically warranted way of counteracting “the illusion that the larger social order knows what it is talking about when it calls for justice” is to refuse to take part in such talk and, instead, to bear witness as the church to a truer, more holy way of relating socially.[12] He sees this not as sectarian. He sees it as the theologically proper way of both effecting social change and restoring the health of the church as a community of upright discipline fostering Christian virtues. The church’s witness was strongest when it was marginalized, he asserts. And this, he believes, is no coincidence. “The current emphasis on justice and rights as the primary norms guiding the social witness of Christians,” he thinks, is endemic to the post-Christendom idea that it is Christianity’s place to speak in the moral language of the world to help to get history right. [13] Paradoxically, though, this plays right into liberalism’s hand, furthering its injustices and perverse social relations by implicitly ratifying its corrupt moral language and practices.

It is now clear that if civic solidarity requires a Christian to speak in the language of rights and justice, Hauerwas renounces it. Indeed, it seems civic solidarity is, in his eyes, a Constantinian mistake. It may seem “friendly” on its surface, but it is ultimately detrimental to the health of the church and the health of society.[14] In order to achieve mutual understanding (a constitutive feature of solidarity, according to Section II), Christians will likely be forced to talk in the corrupt moral language of liberalism, furthering its insidious influence. Furthermore, given that “the existence of the church is the necessary condition for knowing the truth of the way things are,” efforts to agree on common social goods will be, at best, ineffective and, at worst, spiritually dangerous. Certainly the prospect of an inter-tradition understanding of the value or worth of these goods is, in his eyes, to be doubted.

In Hauerwas’s lexicon, it is now evident why civic solidarity, as articulated in Part I, is a ‘bad idea.’ How is a Christian to foster solidarity in a pluralist, liberal society when that society, in contrast to the politics of the church, encourages the development of vices rather than virtues? How is a Christian to share a common history with a nation when it is the narrative of the church with which she ought discriminately to identify? How is a Christian to develop a mutual understanding of shared goals with citizens when her goals are to be uniquely Christian and her singular epistemic location precludes her from mutual understanding with those outside of the church? Finally, how is a Christian to foster a sense of shared identity, when it is precisely a witness to a different political identity that is the proper (and perhaps only) way for the Christian to impact the world positively?

Hauerwas’s rejection of civic solidarity rings clear in his endorsement, in After Christendom?, of the following quote: “We only distract ourselves from building a truly Christian society by trying to make our nation into that society, rather than be content with living as a community-in-exile.”[15] Authentic Christianity relies not on civic solidarity. Quite the contrary: it entails living in a manner of exile. It entails being a resident alien. As things are today, the “church is no longer able to shape the desires and habits of those who claim to be Christian,” writes Hauerwas.[16] An exilic approach is the only way to restore that ecclesiastical power.

Part 4

Charles E. Curran’s Catholic approach to church-world issues reads profoundly differently than this. It heartily endorses extramural participation and cooperation in the manner of locked-arm citizenship in the collective quest for greater social justice. This participation is not for the sake of making the state into a Christian society. It is for the sake of further realizing the intrinsic good of the social relation currently denoted ‘the state.’ As the often-quoted encyclical, Justitia in mundo, states, “Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel.”[17] Curran locates the theological warrant for this kind of civic participation and political solidarity most significantly, in my opinion, in Catholic views of 1) the goodness of creation, 2) human reason, and 3) grace.

In Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present, Curran examines thirteen papal documents and two documents of U.S. Catholic bishops. Together these are generally recognized as the United States’ “canon” of Catholic social thought. Curran synthesizes these documents’ content by addressing specific theological and social issues in turn, tracing official Catholic stances on the issues through recent history.

Running like a thread through the documents is the doctrine of creation’s goodness. This doctrine asserts that, as God’s creative work, the earth and its creatures are inherently good. Consequently, the natural predispositions of earthly creatures bear the mark of God’s creative intention. Not to be ignored, of course, is the theological fact of the fall; the earth and its creatures’ natural dispositions are clouded by sin. Nevertheless, this clouding does not fully obscure God’s intention in nature. Accordingly, humans can discern (more or less accurately, depending upon their virtues of discernment) the authentically natural features of humankind which are God given and therefore good.

One such natural feature is the dignity of the human individual. God crafted each human individually and with a particular love for him or her. Hence, God’s relation to individuals as individuals is precious and irreplaceable.

Another, equally important, feature of humans is their social character. Humans are not meant to be alone. They are meant to communicate with each other, to work with each other, and to love each other. They are meant to form relationships of diverse kinds in equally diverse social contexts. Given this disposition, conceptions of the human self which fail to account sufficiently for sociality are inadequate. As Curran writes, Catholics “understand the person not as an isolated monad but as existing in multiple relationships.”[18] According to this natural fact, persons are “called to live and work with others in the basic communities of the family, the church, broader human social communities, and the state.”[19]

Including the state in this list is significant. It implies that social ordering on the level of statehood is God-intended and part of natural creation. It is not, as some believe, a product of creation’s fall. The state is not fundamentally a coercive social relation necessary only because of the postlapsarian sinfulness of man. To the contrary, politics at a state level is natural, necessary, and fundamentally good. In fact, it is something “to which the individual is called by one’s very nature to belong to achieve one’s own happiness and fulfillment.”[20] Thus human flourishing, the realization of humans’ God-given natural dispositions, depends on governmental participation. It insists on belonging and contributing to a civic level of sociality. Humans, by their very nature, crave identification and membership of a civic-state kind.

Consequently, from a Catholic point of view, civic solidarity is not simply to be politically or practically desired; it is to be theologically valued. A source of civic identification with common goals and a common history is a natural need of humankind. To ignore it is naïve and potentially destructive. The extent to which political liberalism, stressing monadic individualism, ignores or is silent on this natural human disposition is an important question, alluded to above in Sandel’s analysis of America’s regnant political consciousness. Section V examines this matter more fully.

Given the theological desirability of civic solidarity according to Catholic social teaching, what, theologically speaking, should it look like? As Section II made clear, not just any solidarity is good solidarity. This being the case, what ought Christians to be wary of in their participation and membership in civic social relations? On this question, Curran breaks ranks with Hauerwas, claiming that Christians’ participation in political give and take need not be uniquely Christian in any discursive or epistemic sense. While Hauerwas stresses the incommensurability of Christian language, discursive practice, and knowledge with extramural practices of the same, Curran writes:

The documents of Catholic social teaching [claim] that Christians should work with all others for the same basic human rights and common good and imply that there is no unique content that calls for Christians to act in different ways from non-Christians.[21]

Curran and Hauerwas’s marked disagreement on this issue boils down, largely, to different views of human reason.

Catholic social thought since Leo XIII’s Rerum novarum cites Aquinas’s doctrine of natural law as its view of human reason. According to Curran, “the theological aspect of natural law justifies human reason as a source of moral wisdom for Christians and Christian ethics by recognizing natural law as the participation of eternal law in the rational creature.”[22] Consequently, Catholics have a theological warrant for appealing to human reason qua human reason. They have a theological warrant for a discipline called Christian ethics, which does not appeal insularly to divine positive law (scripture) or ecclesiastical practices, but appeals also to human reason on its own terms as a source of moral wisdom.

Hauerwas, as is now clear, rejects this kind of thinking. What, he would ask, is human reason ‘on its own terms?’ Are there any set terms for human reason that are not, in truth, terms posited by the cultural and historical contexts of an individuals’ social surroundings? Curran indirectly addresses this critique. He does so not by way of a direct rejoinder. He adds nuance to his portrayal of papal encyclicals’ moral methodology. And these nuances may parry some of the force of Hauerwas’s critique.

Catholics call the kind of ethical methodology with which Hauerwas takes issue their “philosophical methodology,” in contradistinction to their theological methodology.[23] Curran finds Catholics’ philosophical methodology to be more sophisticated than the often adduced, ‘narrow-minded’ interpretations of Thomistic natural law in which its sole purpose is to produce inflexible, juridical moral rules. These interpretations he dubs the “classicist” approach,[24] and he claims Catholic doctrine is not merely classicist. It employs a “historical consciousness” that adds a level of subtlety to cruder formulations of natural law.[25]

Rerum novarum, the very document to declare Thomistic methodology official, “responds to new circumstances that had arisen concerning the social question and the role of workers.”[26] This reflects a non-trivial historical pliability to Catholic doctrine’s use of natural law. And it is this pliability which Curran calls the doctrine’s “historical consciousness.” John Paul II articulates instructively the kind of dialectic which obtains between the transhistorical truth-value of Catholic doctrine and the different historical contexts to which it must apply:

On the one hand it is constant, for it remains identical in its fundamental inspiration, in its ‘principles of reflection,’ in its ‘criteria of judgment,’ in its basic ‘directives for action,’ and above all in its vital link with the Gospel of the Lord. On the other hand it is ever new, because it is subject to the necessary and opportune adaptations suggested by the changes in historical conditions and by the unceasing flow of the events which are the setting of the life of people and society.[27]

Is this a case of John Paul II wanting to have his cake and eat it too? How may Catholic doctrine posit constants of the kind John Paul II cites and at the same time have a viable means of adaptation? Moreover, what, more specifically, are the “principles of reflection,” “criteria of judgment,” and so on which are constant, and in what sense are they both sufficiently determinate to provide non-trivial constancy and sufficiently indeterminate to provide for historical sensitivity?

Well-articulated natural law theory provides an answer. It suggests there are general principles of human nature which are transhistorical and transcultural. These principles, however, are indeed general. Accordingly, historical and cultural circumstances warrant rigorous consideration in one’s moral reasoning. The issue becomes how to read the applicability of natural law’s general principles to historical and cultural contexts which are irreducibly particular and unique. This takes wisdom and discernment. That is why Aquinas’s discussion of natural law follows his discussion of virtues in the Summa Theologica. Virtues condition one’s epistemic access to natural laws. In particular, the virtues of discernment do so. And these virtues are perverted or perspicacious according to, among other things, the community in which they develop and the relative success one achieves habitually developing them. With this, Thomas’s and Hauerwas’s moral methodologies share ideas one might not expect. Accordingly, a refined articulation of natural law theory may begin to respond to Hauerwas’s critiques regarding the extent to which natural law suggests human reason has transhistorical and transcultural ‘terms of its own.’ Natural law theory claims there are non-trivial transhistorical and transcultural features of human reason, and it is these to which Catholic doctrine appeals as grounds for addressing its encyclicals not only to the Church, but also to “all people of good will.” However, those universal features of human reason are impossible to specify wholly determinately, and divine positive law and a righteous community do condition one’s ability to discern natural law well.[28] Divine positive law and a righteous community sharpen one’s epistemic access to natural laws, but humans are not utterly morally blind without them. Consequently, according to Catholic social teaching, the discursive practices and epistemic contexts of the church are not as incommensurable with the extra-ecclesiastical world as Hauerwas makes them out to be.

And it’s a good thing, too. If Christians and non-Christians had no means of talking morally together, there would be no way of obtaining the civic-social end of human nature necessary for human flourishing. Aquinas writes that “the state is a perfect community.”[29] By this he means it is a basically good social relation of humanity in which Christians ought to participate. And we now see they need not fear that moralizing with non-Christians necessarily furthers a corrupt moral language utterly alien to the church. The eternal law leavens natural law, and true natural laws are such only because of this divine leavening influence. But this dependence on divine leavening does not suggest that moral language failing to be conspicuously Christian is necessarily corrupt. It may bear an unwitting witness to the eternal source of truth that is God, as all created nature does to varying degrees and in varying ways.

Accordingly, appealing to human reason qua human reason for the sake of communication is not eminently taboo; it simply ought to be done with care. One need not speak in such a way that is self-consciously indecipherable to non-Christians or, as Yoder suggests, in such a way that is always in some manner subversive.[30] When the truth is spoken, it will resonate with all people of good will, inside or outside of the church, because all people, as created, participate in nature and, consequently, necessarily participate (granted to varying degrees) in God’s intention for creation that is the leavening influence of eternal law. As an important aside, if this were not the case, natural law doctrine suggests that morality would not have the “binding force” of law. As Aquinas explains, “in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. But such application is made by its being made known to them by promulgation.”[31] For general moral principles to bind all humans, they must be promulgated to all humans. This being the case, God has, indeed, promulgated general moral principles to all humans: “The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s mind so as to be known by him naturally.”[32]

It is God’s intention for all humans, Christians and non-Christians alike, to live together peacefully and to flourish by way of the laws of humans’ individual and social nature. Thus all moral laws are natural laws, to be known not exclusively via divine positive law or ecclesiastical practices, but also by way of nature, which is revelatory itself. Moreover, all laws of practical reasoning necessarily have as their end the common good of all, not only of those currently in the church. As Aquinas writes, God has ensured that “nothing stands firm with regard to practical reason [moral reasoning], unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good. Now whatever stands to reason in this sense has the nature of a law.”[33]

Because all have a measure of access to God’s laws of nature and because God intends for the common good of all in a perfect community of the state, Christians in history bear the task of speaking the truth to power to realize a more perfect civic community. And they need not do this by focusing myopically on the use of speech that sounds distinctively Christian. Because God, by God’s grace, has endued nature with a shadowed reflection of the eternal law, Christians may speak in a way that resonates with all people of good will.

And we are fortunate this is the case. As John XXIII writes, “The grave problems caused by industrial society [can] be solved only by cooperation of all forces…[including] all people of good will.”[34] The state is a natural social relation because there exist natural needs of humanity which more intimate social relations, like the family, cannot adequately address by themselves. Consequently, a better society, a society increasingly equipped to satisfy these needs, requires extramural solidarity. It requires “all people of different religions, races, cultures, and languages to work together for the common good.”[35]

This is one way of understanding why Catholics do not shy away from appealing to the categories of justice and rights. These categories are accessible to all people of good will, however incomplete they may be as moral guides if taken alone. Justice and rights surely do not exhaust Catholics’ moral reasoning. Theologically they can’t. But they do provide a good means by which to talk morally with the wider society. And, in themselves, they are not bad. They are simply shadows of the eternal law. As shadows, they may be abused. But their insufficiencies as moral categories, if used alone, need not preclude Christians from using them correctly and cautiously for the sake of civic solidarity towards greater social progress.

This is precisely what Catholic social thought strives to do. With rights it professes responsibilities. In so doing, it self-consciously rejects the more anemic rights and justice talk of ‘less mature’ forms of liberalism. It doesn’t endorse negative freedoms without answering “to what end.” Freedoms are for the end of the common good. And this common good has substance; it is not mere physical protection and acquisitiveness—the only goods citizens of contractual liberalism seem to be able to take for granted as commonly recognizable. By exhorting Christians and non-Christians to adopt a fuller vision of the common good, Catholic social teaching actively competes with the provincial vision (or, even, lack of vision) of many theories of political liberalism. It exhorts citizens to adopt a fuller vision of mutual understanding of reciprocal sacrifice for the sake of shared interest in the society’s common good. And this is what we found in Section II to be solidarity. Thus we may understand Catholic social thought to be an active attempt to offer a competing vision of social solidarity to the narrowly self-serving solidarity of fear and acquisitiveness prevailing in the United States today.

Part 4

I find elements of both Hauerwas and Curran’s views convincing. I think Catholic social thought is right to believe the state is natural and basically good, and that Christians, in the spirit of neighbor-love and with the assurance of God’s grace, have a theological duty to actively participate in the betterment of public society. On the other hand, I find Hauerwas’s critique of civic solidarity worthwhile also. Political liberalism can indeed be subtle charmer. Without thinking twice, Christians today seem to use reprehensibly narrow conceptions of rights and justice, and these prevailing conceptions can, undoubtedly, corrupt ecclesiastical practice and belief.

What, then, is the answer? How should Christians comport themselves in public, and what manner of civic solidarity can they rightfully endorse, if any? Let us further crystallize the difference between Hauerwas and Curran’s approaches before passing judgment on which seems theologically advisable and what that may mean for Christians living in the United States today.

As mentioned, Hauerwas endorses “living as a community-in-exile.”[36] Only an exilic church can maintain the “kind of discipline that might make it identifiable as a distinct body of people with a mission to perform in the world.”[37] This mission is the development of disciples. As a unique community of discipline, the church provides Christians with the social relations necessary to develop true virtues. Indeed, it provides the only means by which Christians can obtain the virtues necessary for salvation. Without proper direction, an individual cannot know on her own how properly to pray, to worship, or to accept forgiveness. These practices require supervision. And this supervision must come from a community of discipline determined by a narrative un-chosen by any of its members. This recognition that a Christian is “constituted by [a] more determinative narrative that has been given to [her] rather than created by [her]” is “antithetical to the very spirit of modernity,” Hauerwas believes.[38] Consequently, he writes:

the great problem of modernity for the church is how we are to survive as disciplined communities in democratic societies. For the fundamental presumption behind [them] is that the consciousness of something called the common citizen is privileged no matter what kind of formation it may or may not have had… the task of the ethicist [is] to explicate the presuppositions shared by anyone. Ethics is the attempt at the systemization of what we all perhaps only inchoately know or which we have perhaps failed to make sufficiently explicit.[39]

Catholic social thought, on the other hand, believes there is indeed a common epistemological ground upon which citizens qua citizens can stand. This is natural law. Upon it, all humans as humans may converse morally. Aretaic formation and divine positive law are important in sharpening one’s vision of natural law, but non-Christians lacking this “formation,” as Hauerwas would call it, are not precluded entirely from perceiving moral truths. Differing “formations” do not yield an impenetrable epistemological wall between Christian citizens and non-Christian citizens.

Hauerwas responds to Curran, among others, on Catholic social thought in an essay entitled “A Recall to Christian Life.” There, he and Jana Bennett claim “natural law makes sense only against a theological background.”[40] Therefore when John XXIII exhorts his readers to a “‘solidarity of the human race,’ a solidarity anticipated by the Church which is by divine right universal and capable of embracing all people,” he does not suggest that this solidarity is somehow ‘outside God.’[41] To the contrary, John XXIII believes “Such solidarity depends on the recognition of the moral order which has no existence except from God.”[42]

This is incontestably correct regarding John XXIII’s writing. But I think it fails to counter Curran’s view of natural law in the way Hauerwas may think it does. Of course, theologically speaking, there is no moral order which has an existence except from God. Curran does not suggest otherwise. What he does suggest is that natural law is, to varying degrees, epistemically available to all humans as humans. This need not imply that it is somehow separate from God. To the contrary, it is precisely natural law’s participation in the eternal law that gives it its general transhistorical and transcultural characteristics. That is to say, it is precisely because the moral order has no existence except from God that natural law doctrine may claim that all humans as humans have some degree of access to it, regardless of their social contexts. The eternal law’s immutable leavening influence on natural law is the grace of God that allows humans of varying “formations” to talk morally together in a quasi-coherent manner. The coherence of that talk will undoubtedly vary from context to context and from person to person. And agreement will have to come about piecemeal according to the particular premises the interlocutors may happen to share. However, Christians have, by way of the power of God’s grace, the theological right to believe that their moral discussions with non-Christians for the sake of a better society are not necessarily performed in vain. Christians have a theological warrant for a measure of social optimism. In Sollicitudo rei socialis, John Paul II insists that “despite evil and sinfulness, the church has confidence in humanity.”[43] This confidence is based theologically on “the fact of creation by a good and gracious God” and “the redemptive influence of Christ who united himself in some fashion with every human being, and because the efficacious action of the Holy Spirit fills the earth.”[44]

Thus, in our final analysis, we must grant, first, that Hauerwas seems right regarding the condition of civic morality today. It is, in many ways, wanting. Sandel’s account of modern America appears to a significant degree accurate. Modern liberalism’s “vision of political discourse is [in many ways] too spare to contain the moral energies” necessary for robust civic life.[45] “A politics that brackets morality and religion too completely soon generates its own disenchantment. Where political discourse lacks moral resonance, the yearning for a public life of larger meaning finds undesirable expression.”[46] Rather than coming together in solidarity for the sake of a mutually recognized common good, citizens, legislators, and judges often cast political discourse as the mere practice of voting for self-interests. Many Americans today tend to take this for granted as the general substance of politics. And such, it appears, may be partially attributable to the implicit “liberal conception of citizens as freely choosing, independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties antecedent to choice.”[47]

While Hauerwas is likely right to critique this state of politics today, his method to then serve the world, exilic witness, seems to me to be overly reactionary. I find Catholic social thought’s more hopeful view of the contingent commensurability of Christian and non-Christian moral discussion more compelling—theologically, philosophically, and intuitively. Catholics’ approach to serve the world by offering its own take on the common good and its own take on righteous civic solidarity, in terms ‘the world’ might understand, appears both politically and theologically desirable.

Inspired by natural law theory, the grace of God, and the fact that the state, as part of God’s original creation, is meant for good, Catholics have a powerful theological warrant for sympathetic conversation with non-Christians and for an expectation to make progress. Accordingly, Christians may properly expect to achieve mutual understanding for the need of reciprocal sacrifice for the sake of shared interests no one citizen can realize on her own. That is to say, Christians may properly and rightfully expect to foster good civic solidarity in extra-ecclesiastical contexts. Moreover, given the current moral crisis of American politics, in which substantive moral discussion of this kind is largely lacking, it seems the social hope of Catholic teaching is not only theologically warranted, it may be just the right medicine to correct the moral anemia of modern liberalism that Hauerwas critiques so vociferously.

Given the temptations of the world’s politics, Hauerwas calls Christians to recognize “the world cannot be made safe, that there are no solutions” and that Christians ought to learn to “live without answers.”[48] The world will surely never be wholly safe. And there are no ultimate solutions, theologically speaking, short of the ‘Solution’ who will bring the Kingdom of God to earth at the eschaton. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, I feel Catholic social thought is right to see “action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world” to be “a constitutive dimension of the preaching of [and witnessing to] the Gospel.”[49]

The world will always present temptations to the Christian. The answer to this reality is not to refuse to seek common grounds of solidarity with the world. It is not pessimistically to learn the political “art of dying.”[50] It is, by the power and assurance of God’s grace, to embrace hope and the political “art of living.” It is to recognize that grace is precisely that which allows the Christian to seek, with fervor, grounds of solidarity with the extramural world in the spirit of neighbor-love. Grace frees the Christian to love her neighbor without wringing her hands about the health of the church, which, ultimately, is subject to God’s sovereignty and graciousness in the first place. Let us, accordingly, not be complacent with or cynical about either the health of the church or the health of the wider society. God’s grace allows us to pursue both, and apart from God’s grace, we are bound to achieve neither.

Endnotes

[1] Yoder, 40.
[2] Ibid, 11.
[3] Sandel, 14.
[4] Meilaender, 130.
[5] Performing, 232.
[6] After, 16.
[7] Ibid, 6.
[8] Performing, 236; After, 7.
[9] After, 7, my emphasis.
[10] Ibid, 60.
[11] Ibid, 68.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid, 47.
[14] Ibid, 42.
[15] Ibid, 7.
[16] Ibid, 9.
[17] Curran, 12.
[18] Ibid, 3.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid, 40.
[22] Ibid, 53.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid, 54.
[25] Ibid, 55.
[26] Ibid, 57.
[27] Ibid, 64.
[28] Ibid, 49.
[29] Summa Theologica, XC.III.
[30] Yoder, 40.
[31] Ibid, XC.IV.
[32] Ibid, XC.IV.r1.
[33] Ibid, XC.II.r3, my emphasis.
[34] Curran, 47.
[35] Ibid, 42.
[36] After, 7.
[37] Ibid, 93, 95.
[38] Ibid, 109.
[39] Ibid, 97.
[40] “Recall,” sect. 1.
[41] Ibid, sect. 2.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Curran, 42.
[44] Ibid, 43. (Wis 1:7)
[45] Sandel, 323.
[46] Ibid, 322.
[47] Ibid.
[48] After, 12.
[49] Curran, 12.
[50] After, 43.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aquinas, Thomas. Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas. The Summa Theologica. Ed. Anton C. Pegis. New York: Random House, Inc. 1948.

Curran, Charles E. Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present: Historical, Theological, and Ethical Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 2002.

Hauerwas, Stanley. After Christendom?: How the Church is to Behave if Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation are Bad Ideas. Nashville: Abingdon Press. 1991.

-------. Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence. Grand Rapids: Brazos Press. 2004.

------- and Jana Bennett. “‘A Recall to Christian Life’: What is Social about the Catholic Social Teachings?” Unpublished MSS.

Meilaender, Gilbert. The Limits of Love: Some Theological Explorations. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1987.

Sandel, Michael J. Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1996.

Yoder, John Howard. The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1984.

 
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